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Buying Back the West
James R. Rasband
Professor
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University
Public land historians have traditionally broken down the history of public
land law into three distinct periods-acquisition, disposition, and retention.
Sometimes a fourth period-management-is added or combined with the era
of retention. In light of the last couple of decades, it might be time to update
the list and recognize that we have entered a new period which might be
termed a period of reacquisition. Beginning with the rise of the environmental
movement in the late 1960s and 1970s, and accelerating in recent years with
the increasing public preference for preservation and recreational
opportunities, public land law and policy has moved in the direction of
reacquiring natural resources that many perceive to have been unwisely
disposed of during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This
reacquisition has taken a variety of forms, some of which are quite obvious,
whereas others are more subtle. Of the more obvious variety are laws allowing
states, and sometimes private parties, to purchase water rights and dedicate
them to instream flow; the rise of grazing buyouts; and purchases of important
habitat and watersheds using the Land and Water Conservation Fund. A
perhaps less obvious form of reacquisition is the move to more aggressively
regulate natural resource uses in the West. As explored below, such regulation
is largely indistinct from the assertion of a public property right.
The question this essay hopes to address, if only briefly, is how, if we are
indeed at the front end of a new period of acquisition, we ought to achieve that
emerging policy. The essay suggests that the public's preference for
reacquisition will be best fulfilled, not by focusing on regulation, litigation, or
backdoor reacquisition theories like the public trust doctrine, but by actually
buying back the West through a variety of approaches that recognize legitimate
reliance interests in natural resource use and the power of economic incentives
in encouraging private actors to fulfill public purposes.
At the outset it is important to concede that any demarcation of the
periods of public lands policy is not intended to be precise. For a geography as
large as the public lands, and for a law and policy as complex, there will
inevitably be counter-examples inconsistent with broader trends. Thus, even
though most commentators are comfortable with dividing public land history
broadly into periods of acquisition, disposition, and retention, the division is
necessarily imprecise. As Leigh Raymond and Sally Fairfax discussed in their
article, FragmentationofPublic Domain Law and Policy: An Alternative to the
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"Shift-to-Retention" Thesis, the history of the public lands is not nearly so
facile. 1
For example, the period of federal retention is often identified as
beginning around the turn of the twentieth century with passage of the General
Revision Act of 1891,2 which allowed presidents to establish the national
forests, and with the conservation efforts of Pinchot and Roosevelt. The truth is
that the United States had moved to retain some public land-such as
Yellowstone, hot springs in Arkansas, and certain mineral-bearing lands-long
before the General Revision Act, and would continue to dispose of the public
lands long after, whether under the Homestead Act, the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act, or a variety of other disposition statutes that remained in force
or were enacted after 1891. Indeed, it was not until the passage of the Federal
Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) 3 that Congress made a final
decision to retain the public lands, and even now we continue to "dispose" of
public lands and natural resources through the General Mining Law, the
Mineral Leasing Act, Forest Service timber sales, and the like. Nevertheless,
the general categorization of acquisition-disposition-retention works because it
identifies broader historical trends that at some point became clear enough to
identify as the dominant, if not exclusive, approach to public land policy. The
claim for a period of reacquisition is of the same sort. The existence of
counter-examples should not be taken as undermining the thesis but simply
showing its imprecision.
The product of the fragmented but discernible movement in public land
policy from disposition to retention is, not surprisingly, a fragmented
landscape. Public lands are shot through with mining claims, state school trust
sections, and other inholdings. In some cases, desirable private land might
adjoin or be intermixed with a federal designation. A portion of the watershed
of a national park might, for example, be privately owned. In other cases,
private land might be critical habitat or have other qualities that the public
would like to preserve. This fragmentation creates tremendous natural resource
management difficulties because of mismatches between political and
biophysical scale.
In addition to presenting management challenges, the disposition policies
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries often appear misguided when judged
against today's priorities. As Jan Laitos has described, it is increasingly the
case that the preferred use of the public lands is for recreation and
preservation. 4 The mere shift to a policy of retention is insufficient to fulfill
1See generally Leigh

Raymond & Sally Fairfax, Fragmentationof Public Domain Law and Policy:

An Alternative to the "Shift-to-Retention" Thesis, 39 NAT. RESOUpCES J. 649 (1999).

226 Stat. 1095.

'43 U.S.C. § 170 1(a) (2000).

4 See generally Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY

L.Q. 140 (1999).
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this growing public demand for preservation and recreation. Nor does retention
address the management problems of fragmentation. If such issues are to be
addressed, there is really only one answer and that is the reacquisition of the
land and resources misallocated and mismatched. Unsurprisingly, that is the
direction in which law and policy have been moving.
To date, the preferred approach to reacquisition has been increased
regulation of resource users, whether through the Endangered Species Act,
restrictions on access, 3809 regulations to cover environmental harm from
mining, or changes in the range code, to give just a few examples. Some may
object to the characterization of such regulation as a form of acquisition. In
their view, this description may appear to assume that by regulating property
the public always acquires a benefit for itself as opposed to preventing harm to
itself by having resource users internalize a few of their externalities. The
description of regulation as reacquisition is not intended to take sides in that
debate. Rather, it is intended to recognize that there is no obvious distinction
between regulation and the assertion of a public property right. As Dan Cole
explains, if land and natural resources in the initial position are common pool
resources to be allocated by the sovereign, all sovereign decisions can be
described as allocating ownership.
What distinguishes th[e] regulatory approach from "privatization" is
not the existence or nonexistence of property rights but only the type of
property regime imposed. Privatization converts nonproperty into private
(individual or common) property. Government regulation typically (if
tacitly) converts nonproperty into public/state property or some mixed form
of public and private property. It may be objected that government
regulation constitutes an exercise in imperium (sovereign authority) rather
than dominium (ownership). However, this old Roman-law distinction
marks little practical difference. Property and sovereignty are both forms of
power-as Denman puts it, "a sanction and authority for decisionmaking"--over resources. Whether the state is purporting to5 act as
sovereign or owner, the rights it asserts are in the nature of property.
Even if one is inclined to disagree with Cole's typology, the view of this
essay's thesis need only be altered slightly. Whereas this essay suggests that
regulation should not be the default reacquisition tool, if one views regulation
as distinct from ownership, the essay can simply be understood to advocate
focusing less on regulation and more on traditional reacquisition.
If the shift to reacquisition has thus far been largely a function of
regulation, that has not been its only manifestation. The effort to reacquire land
and resources improvidently allocated in the past has taken other forms as well,
5 DANIEL
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and the momentum for such approaches appears to be increasing. Below, the
essay considers a few examples of kinder, gentler reacquisition and suggests
that they are often preferable to reacquisition via regulation. The examples
coalesce around two basic principles. First, they exhibit respect for property
rights or, to the extent there is not a formal property interest, as in the case of
grazing permits, they value the legitimate and longstanding reliance interests of
resource users. Second, they recognize the value of achieving public
reacquisition goals by facilitating, rather than demanding, private preservation
efforts, typically by using economic incentives or other quasi-market
approaches.
Perhaps the most straightforward example of the shift to reacquisition,
and one that also emphasizes the imprecision of demarcating a precise
beginning to the shift, is the Land and Water Conservation Fund of 1965
(LWCF), which was established precisely for the purpose of buying back
critical land and resources.6 The two most prominent recent uses of the LWCF
were the Clinton Administration's negotiation of purchase and exchange
agreements for the New World Mine near Yellowstone National Park and the
Headwaters ancient redwood grove in California, which were then funded by
Congress from the LWCF. Unfortunately, Congress has rarely appropriated all
of the available funds from the $900 million credited each year to the LWCF.
In 2000, Congress looked set to alter the LWCF to make it a true trust fund
under which the money allocated to the LWCF could not be used for other
purposes. The Conservation and Reinvestment Act (CARA) proposed to
guarantee $3 billion per year for 15 years to a number of different conservation
programs.7 Although CARA passed the House by a wide margin (315 to 103),
it died before it reached the floor of the Senate, partly because of appropriation
committee concerns about retaining their power to direct spending and partly
because of the concerns of self-styled property rights advocates who feared
additional public ownership in the West. The latter objection seems
particularly irrational. If reacquisition is going to happen, and given public
preference it almost surely will, one wonders why a "property rights advocate"
would oppose a buyback when the alternative is likely regulation and litigation
of the properties targeted for purchase under the LWCF.
Another approach to reacquisition, and one focused as much on correcting
mismatches as on fulfilling public preference, is the Clinton Administration's
efforts to exchange public lands for inheld state and private lands. The most
prominent example is the federal deal with Utah in which Utah gave up
363,000 acres of school trust lands, which were inheld within national parks,
monuments, forests, recreation areas, and Indian reservations, for $50 million
and 145,000 acres of federal lands elsewhere in the state that had significant
6 Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 - 4601-11 (2000)).
7H.R.

701, 106th Cong. (2000).
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potential for coal and natural gas development.8 As with the straightforward
use of the LWCF, exchanges recognize the legitimate property interests of
state and private inholders and avoid the need to fight costly battles, whether
by regulation or litigation, over access across precious federal lands to inheld
parcels for resource development.
Unfortunately, just as in the case of the LWCF, this collaborative and
rights-respecting approach to reacquisition has drawn fire, only this time the
criticism has come from those who think the approach is unfair to the United
States, allegedly because the BLM has been negotiating exchanges that do not
provide the federal government an adequate return for the land exchanged.
While there is no excuse for BLM's failure to adhere to existing legal
standards on equal value exchanges, part of the problem is that current
exchange rules focus on the potential economic returns to be derived from the
property acquired and do not adequately account for the aesthetic and
recreation value of property which is usually the primary reason for promoting
the exchange. If the BLM deserves some criticism, Congress, which does not
operate under the same legal constraints, should be praised when it legislates
exchanges that achieve significant management and preservation objectives,
even if the exchange is not strictly of equal value in economic terms. In truth,
if non-market values are considered, criticized exchanges look a lot better; and
to the extent the United States ends up paying a premium, it may well come
out ahead if the alternative is costly fights over resource development on
inholdings. President Clinton seemed to recognize this basic fact when he
instructed the Department of the Interior in negotiating the exchange of Utah's
school lands within the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument that
"reasonable differences in valuation" should be resolved "in favor of the
school trust." 9

Another example of kinder, gentler reacquisition, but this time on the state
side, is legislation to allow state agencies to purchase or accept donations of
existing water rights and dedicate the water to instream flow. As in the federal
context, states are faced with a problem-they have allocated a natural
resource to private users but now the public prefers a different allocation,
namely instream flow for habitat and recreational purposes. A state looking
into its reacquisition toolbox could turn to an aggressive application of the
beneficial use doctrine or public trust doctrine and argue that limitations on
water use imposed under either doctrine always inhered in a user's water right.
Such a move, however, tends to run roughshod over the reasonable reliance
interests of water rights holders who, looking at a century of water practice and
'See Brent Israelsen, Leavitt to Sign Pact Todayfor Land Swap, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 8, 1998, at

DI.

9 See SHANNON KELLY, GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE NATIONAL MONUMENT, UTAH - THE
CREATION OF GSENM: A CASE STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF LAND USE (John D. Grahame & Thomas D. Sisk
eds., 2002), at hnp://www.cpluhna.nau.edu/Places/gsenm4.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
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judicial decisions, would have been hard-pressed to discern such an application
of the two doctrines. Although one may legitimately dispute the precise
content of appropriative water rights, a diverter's reliance interests are at least
sufficient to justify an initial effort to satisfy the public's reacquisition desire
by relying on state buybacks of existing water rights or, as some states have
done, by allowing private parties to serve the public interest by acquiring water
rights and dedicating the water to instream flow.
At first glance, it may appear that this latter example of private
acquisition of instream flow rights is inconsistent with the broader thesis of a
shift toward public reacquisition of natural resources, but it need not be
understood that way. Rights dedicated to instream flow, even if held by a
private party, are generally available for public use and fulfill public purposes.
The state achieves its reacquisition goals by removing an impediment to
private achievement of those same goals. While one might fear that the private
instream flow right is perhaps less permanent than a public instream right
because it would be subject to market pressure and theoretically could be
changed to an out-of-stream use, the truth is that the public instream flow right
is subject to political and public choice pressures that can be just as fierce as
those of the market.
In much the same way that allowing private instream flow rights is
consistent with the reacquisition thesis, so too are the various state and federal
efforts to create incentives to preserve land, habitat, and threatened species. In
the last couple of decades, for example, there has been a tremendous boom in
conservation easements. From one perspective, it may seem as though the
work of land trusts like The Nature Conservancy and the Trust for Public
Lands is quintessentially private. However, the conservation easement boom
has been driven largely by state and federal tax incentives for charitable
giving; and those tax incentives are only available if the conservation
easements fulfill certain statutory objectives.' 0 In essence, state and federal
governments are spending money through their tax codes to achieve
reacquisition of land and habitat. The government has slightly less control of
the lands on which the money is spent, and there have been abuses of the
system (witness the recent Washington Post expose of some of The Nature
Conservancy's practices), but such tax expenditures are less costly than fullfledged public reacquisition. Moreover, it is not entirely clear that private
decisions about critical habitat will be less wise than those of public officials.
Of further benefit, incentives for private habitat conservation decrease the need
to use regulatory or litigation approaches to reacquire necessary habitat.
'0See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 170(O(3)(B) (1976) (providing for tax deductions for land and conservation
easements given to environmental charities for conservation purposes); MINN. STAT. §§ 272.02(10), (11)
(1993) (exempting from property tax undisturbed wetlands and ungrazed native prairie upon certification by
the state department of natural resources).
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As a matter of long-term trends, grazing permits on the public lands,
particularly the arid lands of the desert Southwest, also appear headed for
reacquisition and reallocation to different uses. Because the permits are not
private property, there would be few legal impediments to a federal decision to
terminate ranchers' grazing permits. On the other hand, ranchers and public
land communities have significant reliance interests in being able to continue
to graze. If reacquisition is coming, what is the best method? Instead of simply
terminating the permits, or regulating grazing into submission, a preferable
approach is that used by organizations, such as The Grand Canyon Trust, who
have decided to recognize the value of the ranchers' nonproperty reliance
interests by buying out and then retiring their grazing permits. Again, the
apparently private transaction is thoroughly commingled with federal
reacquisition preferences because the BLM must amend its land use plans to
actually retire grazing on the purchased allotments. A similar approach,
although one that tends to hurt the market for the allotment-by-allotment
approach of The Grand Canyon Trust, is that proposed by The Public Lands
Grazing Campaign under which the federal government would essentially
condemn grazing permits for $175 per AUM. Discouragingly, the equitable
efforts of The Grand Canyon Trust and others have been rejected by some
members of the ranching community who decry what they see as an effort to
end their way of life. What the ranchers fail to see is that as a matter of both
ranching economics and changing public land preferences, reacquisition is
coming, and that buyouts-which require negotiation and recognize reliance
interests--offer the fairest possible method of achieving that objective.
While it seems evident that a shift to reacquisition is underway and that
the primary question with which we ought to struggle is how best to achieve
that reacquisition, those in the free-market environmental community might
well disagree and suggest that what we really need is another period of
disposition. Although free-market environmentalists have expressed approval
for efforts to use positive incentives rather than prohibitory regulation to
influence individuals to preserve nature,t 1 they would surely be wary of any
project or trend labeled "reacquisition." Given the federal government's
management track record and the too frequent fulfillment of the postulates of
public choice theory, their concerns should not be easily dismissed. I do not
mean to suggest that there are not circumstances in which to pursue
privatization. Nevertheless, for those of us who perceive the very publicness of
the public lands (or at least much of the public lands) to be part of their value,
broad-gauge privatization is an unattractive alternative to equitable
reacquisition.
11See John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Environmental Entrepreneurs: Keys to Achieving Wilderness
Conservation Goals?, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 519, 521 (1999) (praising policies that create "environmental
entrepreneurs" who "specialize in identifying conservation opportunities, mobilizing resources, and building
a constituency for conservation").
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Others may object to the emphasis on a buyback approach on the theory
that the public should not pay resource users for anything but the most clearly
defined and recognized property rights. Why, after all, should the public pay
for that which it already effectively owns as a function of its police power?
This is a legitimate question and I do not mean to suggest that there is no role
for regulation as part of a reacquisition policy, particularly where the negative
externalities of a resource use are substantial. Nevertheless, alternative
approaches to reacquisition should not be limited solely to those instances
where regulation would result in a constitutional taking. Buying back the West
can make sense even when payment is not constitutionally required. In some
cases, such as with arid lands grazing, buying back permits will likely prove
less costly in the long run than regulation and management of grazing. In other
cases, such as with conservation easements, public funds augment private
efforts and arguably produce more reacquisition benefits than regulation could
achieve. However, even when regulation can achieve reacquisition at less cost,
the equitable consideration of the longstanding reliance interests of many
resource users, as well as the prudential consideration of what sort of
reacquisition is politically feasible, may merit an alternative approach.
The public lands are on the front end of a period of reacquisition that has
the potential to unfold through a variety of different mechanisms. Of the
available approaches, the sort described in the examples above ought to receive
increased emphasis in the future. In the long term, buying back the West will
likely achieve more for the public and the environment, be generally less
costly, and ultimately be fairer to existing resource users and resourcedependent communities.

